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HOW MUCH DO WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
VALUE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE?:
IMMIGRATION LAW'S CONFLICTED ANSWERS
Nora V.Demleitner*
The terms "family" and "marriage" are culturally based concepts,
shaped through a variety of experiences, including cultural and legal. In
popular discourse, "family" and "spouse" are often used as if they were
self-explanatory. This is even true in human rights documents which
recognize "family [as] the natural and fundamental group unit of society
[which] is entitled to protection by society and the State." 1 However,
these documents provide
no universally agreed upon definition of what
2
constitutes a family.

* Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; LL.M. in
International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks go to the
organizers of the Conference on Marriage, Democracy and Families, and especially Professor Linda
McClain, for inviting me to participate, and to the Hofstra Law Review for publishing the papers.
Professors Stephen Legomsky and Mary Jane Mossman were particularly helpful in reviewing a
draft of this article. Excellent research assistance was provided by Rudy Fusco, Daniel Smith, and
Jennifer Wiggins. As always, my special gratitude goes to Hofstra's law librarian Patricia Kasting.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 16, 3, U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 17, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 150 (entered into force July 18,
1978) ("The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection
by society and the state."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10, § 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 4, 7
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) ("[The family] is the natural and fundamental unit of society .. ");
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (declaring the family "the fundamental group of society and
the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members"); African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 18, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1986) ("The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society."); European Social Charter
(revised), 2 E.T.S. 163, Part I, § 16 (1996).
2. See Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 39th Sess., General Comment 19, Article
23, at 28, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1 (1994).
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Law has played a crucial role in shaping, developing, and
delimiting the content of these crucial concepts. Domestic law delineates
clearly how to understand the term "child" for purposes of, for example,
immigration law. 3 Such a definition may track the meaning of the term
as it is commonly understood. In some cases, however, the law may
have shaped the meaning of a term, such as "spouse." Many countries
have denied recognition to polygamous marriages by labeling them
bigamous, and therefore illegal.4 This means that under United States or
French law, a second wife is not a spouse at all, while under the laws of
Saudi Arabia she would be a spouse. 5 Here law, as shaped by custom
and religion, has determined the content of the term.6 The same
development has occurred with regard to the term "child." This,
however, has come to be construed more broadly rather than narrowly,
as children born outside of marriage are considered the children of the
woman and the man who conceived them. 7 While in the past the child
had no right to any relationship with the father and his family, she has
been increasingly viewed as part of the mother's and the father's
families, with rights to both.8

3.

See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)

(2000).
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) ("Polygamy has always been
odious among the northern and western nations of Europe .... At common law, the second
marriage was always void, and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an
offence against society.").
5. See, e.g., JACQUELINE BHABHA & SUE SHUTTER, WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: WOMEN UNDER
IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY AND REFUGEE LAW 124-26 (1994) (discussing how, while most
western European countries do not recognize a second wife, polygamy is recognized in many
Islamic nations).
6. Sub-groups within a society may still recognize a different, more expansive definition of
the term "spouse" even if it goes against the national consensus and law. For example, some
Mormons in rural
Utah and adjoining states are alleged to be married through a church ceremony to
more than one woman. The state legislatures and prosecutors have attempted to clamp down on
such practices. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Young Brides Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at Al.
7. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause affords children born out of wedlock the same legal protection as children whose
parents were married. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (ruling "a state may not
invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children").
8. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that the Court has "invalidated
classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their
parents"); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 (1979)
(finding that Belgium's law violated Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights by distinguishing between inheritance rights of children born to unmarried mothers and those
born to married mothers with regard to the mother and her family); cf Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978) (ruling that a New York statute, which permitted only those illegitimate children that had
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The recent increase in migration around the world has begun to
change the functioning as well as the legal definition of family
dramatically. 9 Many families and married couples are at least
temporarily separated because one or more members of the household
relocate to another country. 10 Unless they are able to migrate together,
the family member(s) left behind must often endure long waiting periods
until they can rejoin their family members in the foreign country or until
the migrant returns. Such separation may occur because the family does
not have the funds that would allow all family members to migrate
together, or because of administrative delays or immigration restrictions.
In some cases, immigrants may be permanently separated if legal
constraints deny their partner or relative the right to join them. This may
be the case with same-sex partners or extended family members who are
not eligible for family migration.
Even families who succeed in migrating as a unity, legally or
without permission, or in reconstituting themselves abroad, may later be
separated through state action. Family members who lack legal status or
have engaged in activity that makes them deportable may be returned to
their country of origin while the rest of the family may continue to
remain in their domicile."
This Article addresses how immigration laws and international
prescriptions have shaped the concept of marriage and family in the

proved paternity during the biological father's lifetime to be the lawful distributees of the estate, did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because of the substantial state interest in preventing fraud).
9. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 provide the
broadest definition of "family," as they deem any group that lives together and wants to live
together-an objective and subjective view-a family. The Commentary to the Additional Protocols
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 narrows this interpretation, however, by stating that "the family
covers persons related by blood and living together as one household." INT'L COMM. OF RED CROSS
(ICRC), COMMENTARY TO THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 Art. 78 (Sandoz et al. eds., 1986). Further explanations of the
Convention definition focus on its subjective part and hold that unrelated persons who share in a
joint household are to be considered family.
10. "[F]amilies separated by migration 'are becoming increasingly common, and will become
a defining characteristic of societies in many countries in the twenty-first century."' Kate Jastram,
Family Unity:
The New
Geography of Family Life (May
1, 2003),
at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=118 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of Migrants, Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro).
11. Terminology may become difficult here. The country in which the family lives may be the
country of migration but it can also be the country of origin for some family members. The latter is
the case if the migrant marries a national or if two migrants have children together in the country to
which they migrated. While some countries categorize the latter as non-nationals, it is difficult to
consider their parents' home country or countries their country of origin.
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United States and other Western democracies. 12 Part I focuses largely on
the current right of migrants, including refugees, to join other family
members. 13 It looks at a few migrant categories as well as different
family members' rights of access. Part II details the reverse: the
destruction of (traditionally conceived) marriages and families through
deportation. In both ways, the law contributes to the formation and
constitution of family and marriage. Both parts of this Article will also
discuss how migrants circumvent the law to create, or recreate, their
families in the country of migration. In a more mobile world, law will
fail in keeping many individuals who have a strong emotional bond from
joining each other in the country the family selects as more desirable.
This Article focuses largely on the existing immigration regimes in
North America and Western Europe. Even though all of these countries
are industrialized democracies that have confronted increasing numbers
of immigrants throughout the last two decades, the comparative
approach will highlight the diversity in their legislation, often depending
on existing attitudes toward both migration and families. While current
family-related immigration provisions have been analyzed in light of
their impact on marriage and family formation, much less work has been
done on the influence deportation has had on these entities. Much of the
analysis of immigration law tends to focus on how immigration rules
regulate and channel immigration of individuals, father than on the
impact they have on the migration of families and couples.
I.

THE RIGHT OF MIGRANTS TO FAMILY UNION

International migrants can be grouped in a variety of different
ways, with often overlapping categories. One categorization sets out the
reasons why migrants leave their home countries: some are economic
migrants, which may take the form of temporary or permanent
migration. Others come as family migrants, which means they come to
join family members already settled in a third country. A third category
are refugees and asylum seekers who have to leave their home countries
12.

No single document regulates the entry of family members into a state's territory. Instead,

the prevailing rules are part of multiple international documents and rights guaranteed through
domestic law.
13. This Article discusses the right of family members to enter and stay permanently in the
receiving country. Another important right is the right to visit family members abroad, especially
for momentous occasions, such as weddings and funerals. For a discussion of the British appeals
process in the denial of such family visitor visas, see VERITY GELSTHORPE ET AL., HOME OFFICE,
FAMILY VISITOR APPEALS: AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION TO APPEAL AND DISPARITIES IN
SUCCESS
RATES
BY
APPEAL
TYPE
(2003),
at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/

pdfs2/rdsolr2603.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/11

4

Demleitner: How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immig

2003]

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IMMIGRATION LAW

because of persecution on account of their political, religious, racial
or
14
group.
social
particular
a
to
belong
they
because
or
affiliation
ethnic
Another way in which one frequently finds migrants categorized is

between those who are in a country permanently and those who are there
only temporarily, such as students and intra-company transfers. A third
classification approach distinguishes between those who have legal
status and those who do not. 15 Often the lines between these two groups

are not as sharply drawn as one might assume but rather are ambiguous3
and, depending on the country, fluid. Migrants without stay rights,
however, find themselves in a legally precarious situation, endowed
with
17
16
the fewest legal rights and subject to removal at any point.
Depending on the category in which migrants find themselves, they
have more or less generous family unification rights. Citizens have the
most robust rights to family unification, followed by those with

permanent rights to stay. States have granted certain temporary visa
holders rights to family unification 8 but have generally not done so for
the undocumented. 19
The strongest right to family unification exists between spouses and
between minor, unmarried, and dependent children and their parents.
The rights of adult, married children to be united with their parents are
much more limited as are the rights to unification with siblings or
members of a more extended household, such as aunts or cousins.

14. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1A(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan.
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 270 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (extending
geographical coverage of Refugee Convention but leaving substantive definition unchanged); INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000) (defining term "refugee," in accord with Refugee
Convention).
15. For further information on the classification of international migrants, see generally
Reginald T. Appleyard, Trends in InternationalMigration in the 1990s and Beyond, in MIGRATION
POLICIES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 33 (Giacomo Luciani ed., 1993).

16. Even undocumented migrants enjoy certain legal protections and rights. See, e.g., Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that alien children have a right to free public education at the
primary and secondary level).
17. In a few situations even undocumented migrants may be granted permission to stay. See,
e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2003) (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status
for certain nonpermanent residents).
18. Often it is in a state's interest to provide at least spouses and minor children with the right
to accompany a visa holder. They provide stability and the right to bring them along makes
migration more attractive.
19. See generally Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right to Family
Reunification, COM(2002) 225 final [hereinafter Family Reunification] (limiting family unification
rights to "third-country nationals residing lawfully on the territory of the Member States").
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The unification of married couples is viewed widely as customary,
though it is often subject to substantial delay. 20 Non-married partners
have often found it more difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to
move abroad with their partners. While different-sex couples have the
legal option of getting married, the same does not exist in most countries
for same-sex partners. It is the latter group's right to family unification
that has attracted the most interest in the United States.2'
A.

Couples: The MarriagePrivilege

The right of married couples to live together is generally
acknowledged. However, it is not always obvious in which country the
two have the right to co-habit. Historically the right of women to have
their husbands join them has been more limited than the husbands' right.
Women are frequently assumed to relocate to their husbands' home
rather than the reverse.2 2 This presumption was part of the law in many
countries, including the United States and Great Britain, where women
even lost their citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner. 23 In Western
countries such rules and formal restrictions on the migration of foreign
husbands have largely been abolished, albeit recently.2 4

20. See Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 956 n.84
(2001).
21. See, e.g., Mara Schulzetenberg, U.S. Immigration Benefits for Same Sex Couples: Green
Cards for Gay Partners?, 9 WM. & MARY J.WOMEN & L. 99, 110 (2002).
22. See, e.g., Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 471 (1985); Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion
OC-4/84 (ser. A, no. 4), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 19, 1984) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. For
a discussion of yet earlier legislation in which women lost their citizenship upon marriage to a
foreigner, see BHABHA & SHUTTER, supra note 5, at 17-28 (1994) (describing British laws from
1870 until 1948, when legislation depriving British women marrying a foreigner of their British
citizenship was repealed). This held true also in the United States for women who married nonUnited States citizens between 1907 and 1922. See generally CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A
NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998).
23. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228
("[A]ny American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband. At the termination of the marital relation she may resume her American
citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year with a
consul of the United States, or by returning to reside in the United States, or, if residing
in the United States at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside
therein."),
repealed by Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1022 ("Cable Act"); BHABHA & SHUTTER,
supra note 5, at 17-28 (discussing British law). See also INA § 324, 8 U.S.C. § 1435 (1999)
(restoring United States citizenship of women deprived of their nationality because of marriage to a
foreign citizen).
24. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471 (ser. A) (1985); Proposed
Amendments, supra note 22.
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Other restrictions remain. Western countries generally deny
recognition to polygamous marriages, which means only the first wife
can benefit from spousal unification.25 This presents particular problems
for refugees and asylum seekers.26 The United Nations High

Commission for Refugees must attempt to resettle them in countries that
recognize polygamous marriage.27 In some cases, Western countries,
such as the United States, have made exceptions, albeit not officially
acknowledged, to the prohibition. This was the case, for example, when
some Iraqi men were accepted as refugees after having collaborated with
the United States government during and after the first Gulf War. In
those situations it appears unconscionable to leave their multiple spouses
and children from these marriages behind in countries where their lives
would be threatened, or in refugee camps in third world countries.
Family unification outside the refugee context always excludes
polygamous spouses.2 8 While polygamy has become a hot political issue
in France,29 it has sparked almost no discussion in the United States.3 °
Here the dispute about "spousal" migration has centered on same-sex
marriages. Because of the lack of recognition of same-sex relationships
under federal law, 3' United States immigration law does not allow same-

sex partners to migrate as "spouses. ' 32
25. See, e.g., Prakash A. Shah, Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law, 52 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q.
369, 389 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Polygamy Dilemma for Immigration, THE DOMINION (Wellington, New
Zealand), Mar. 16, 2000, at 8 (describing difficulties Somali refugees with multiple spouses pose for
the immigration system).
27. See Protecting the Family: Challenges in Implementing Policy in the Resettlement
Context, Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement 6 (June 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ [hereinafter Protectingthe Family].
28. See, e.g., Family Reunification, supra note 19, art. 4(4) (prohibiting entry and residence of
a further spouse and children of such spouse if the applicant already has a spouse living with him in
an EU member state).
29. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, African Women in FranceBattling Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1996, at AI (describing some of the fraudulent practices immigrant men use to bring in more
than one spouse, often leaving wives other than the first in legal limbo). For a discussion of English
law and practice, see generally Shah, supra note 25.
30. But see Stephanie Forbes, Comment, "Why Just Have One? ": An Evaluation of the AntiPolygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1519, 1541-46 (2003)
(arguing that current Establishment Clause jurisprudence would permit polygamy, which the author
views as beneficial to women and children). The issue has been raised recently in connection with
the discussion about same-sex marriages.
31. Cities that allow for the registration of same-sex unions call these "civil unions" or
"domestic partnerships," not marriage. See James M. Donovan, Comment, Same-Sex Union
Announcements: Precis On A Not So Picayune Matter, 49 LOY. L. REv. 171, 171-72 (2003). The
state of Vermont does not style its legislation allowing for officially recognized same-sex unions as
part of its marriage legislation. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (2000). Subsequent congressional
legislation denied recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Vermont's same-sex union.
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Countries that allow for the immigration of same-sex partners also
permit the immigration of unmarried opposite-sex partners.33 The
recognition of opposite-sex relationships for immigration purposes
generally has facilitated the recognition of same-sex relationships, as the
only difference is in the gender of the sponsor or the beneficiary rather
than the quality of the relationship. Moreover, in those countries the
domestic recognition of same-sex partnerships, although they may not be
endowed with the same rights as marriages, preceded immigration
rights. 34 New Zealand and Canada, for example, both permit nonmarried opposite sex partners to sponsor each other.35 The same holds
true for a number of European Union ("EU") member states, including

See H.R. Res. 3396, 104th Cong., 142 CONG. REC. 7270, 7271 (1996) (enacted); S. 1999, 104th
Cong., 142 CONG. REC. 9072, 9073 (1996) (enacted). Absent a state constitutional amendment, the
recent ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Court will make that state the first to recognize samesex marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
32. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") does not provide a definition of "spouse"). In recent years
legislation has been introduced to recognize same-sex relations for immigration purposes. See
Permanent Partners Immigration Act, H.R. 690, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Michael A.
Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration Law, 11 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 475 (2002); Desiree Alonso, Note, Immigration Sponsorship Rights for Gay and Lesbian
Couples: Defining Partnerships, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 208 (2002); Christopher A.
Duenas, Note, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing Binational Same-Sex
Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 836-40 (2000); Brian McGloin, Comment, Diverse Families with
ParallelNeeds: A Proposalfor Same-Sex Immigration Benefits, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 159, 170
(1999). Limitations on the recognition of opposite-sex relationships that exist outside of marriage
appear to be less problematic since these individuals would have the right and opportunity to marry,
but choose not to exercise this option.
33. See, e.g, McGloin, supra note 32, at 170, 172 (England and Canada, respectively); Wayne
van der Meide, Who Guards the Borders of Canada's "'Gay" Community: A Case Study of the
Benefits of the ProposedRedefinition of "Spouse " Within the Immigration Act to Include Same-Sex
Couples, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 39,40 (2001).
34. For a discussion of the different national approaches to the recognition of marriage, see
Symposium, Queer Law 2000: CurrentIssues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and TransgenderLaw, 26
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 191-98 (2001) [hereinafter Symposium] (statement by Dr.
Yuval Merin); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex MarriageDebate: A
Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000) (comparing
Vermont, Netherlands, and Denmark).
35. Canadian law currently allows the sponsorship of same-sex couples only through
humanitarian and compassionate provisions of the Immigration Act. See Immigration Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. 1-227, § 114 (Can.). This, however, is a discretionary process which might be open to
abuse. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS, ch. 3, pt. III (Dec. 21, 2001). The new Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, however, has changed this situation and explicitly recognizes same-sex partners as a
sponsorable category of family members. See also Alonso, supra note 32, at 221-23.
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the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.3 6 In all of these countries
same-sex relationships are legally recognized. 37 The EU's proposed
directive on family unification continues to grant member states the right
to determine whether to treat unmarried couples as if they were
married.38 Citizens and permanent residents who want to gain admission
for their partners must be able to show that they have lived or plan to
live in a joint household with the foreign partner and that a committed
relationship exists. 39 The problems with proof are similar to those
encountered in marriage-based relationships.40 In both situations the
immigration services will require evidence of the relationship. 4'
The limited recognition of same-sex partnerships for immigration
42
purposes causes difficulties for migrants, including refugees. For
example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") recognizes same-sex unions for purposes of refugee
36. See, e.g., The State (Netherlands) v. Reed, [1986] E.C.R. 1283, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 448,
450, 467 (explaining the then existing Dutch law which granted the right of residence to foreigners
in stable relationships with Dutch nationals and persons with permanent right of residence and
holding that Netherlands must also extend such rights to EU nationals to prevent discrimination on
grounds of nationality). For a discussion of the legal development in England, see Symposium,
supranote 34, at 190 (statement by Lavi S. Soloway). The ability to immigrate an unmarried partner
is likely closely tied to the large number of unmarried couples living together, often with their
children, in these countries. The percentages are substantially higher than in the United States which
appears to be more marriage focused. See Kim Kantorowicz, Comment, Cohabitationin Minnesota:
From Love to Contract-PublicPolicy Gone Awry, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 213, 214 n.2 (2000);
Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lesbians and Gay Men,
Their Families,and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998).
37. For Canada's movement toward the full recognition of same-sex relationships as
marriages, see Clifford Krauss, Gay Canadians' Quest for Marriage Seems Near Victory, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2003, at A3. See also generally Marianne DelPo Kulow, Same Sex Marriage:A
Scandinavian Perspective, 24 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 419 (2002) (discussing legal
developments in Denmark, Iceland and the Netherlands, with the last recognizing same-sex
marriage).
38. See Family Reunification, supra note 19, art. 4(3). For a critique of the draft directive on
this issue, see Lina Papadopoulou, In(di)visible Citizens(hip): Same-sex Partners in European
Union Immigration Law, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 229,235-39 (2003).
39. See Papadopoulou, supra note 38, at 234 n.35; see also Alonso, supra note 32, at 221-24
(discussing current laws in the United Kingdom and Finland).
40. In 1986 the United States passed legislation to prevent marriage fraud. It requires
documentation of the marriage and the existence of a joint household. Moreover, the marriage must
exist for two years before the sponsored foreigner may acquire permanent residence. During the
initial two year period the right to stay is contingent upon the existence of the relationship. INA
§ 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (conditional permanent resident status). See, e.g., Lolita Buckner Inniss,
Dutch Uncle Sam: Immigration Reform and Notions of Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 177, 197
(1998).
41. See Family Reunification, supranote 19, art. 5(2).
42. Refugees are frequently granted preferential treatment, as they had to leave their home
countries involuntarily. See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 790 (5th ed. 2003).
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resettlement.43 However, because of the restrictions on such migration
by many potential resettlement countries, UNHCR is limited to Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, and a number of European countries for the
resettlement of same-sex refugees.
Moreover, because of the prevalent limitation of spousal migration
to married couples, many same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex couples
cannot settle in either country of nationality unless they do so without
government permission or under a non-family-related immigration
rubric. 44 Same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex partners often enter the
United States temporarily on tourist visas, 45 or may be able to secure
temporary work permits.46 If no legal route is open to them, some may
choose to live in one country without documentation of the legality of
their stay. This means, however, that the undocumented partner lives
constantly under the threat of deportation.
While the lack of recognition of same-sex relationships for
immigration benefits may be symbolic of the disadvantages
homosexuals suffer, immigration procedure often harms married couples
as well. In many countries, including the United States, administrative
delays separate married couples at least for a number of months, and
sometimes even years, even if one of the partners is a citizen of the
country to which the other would like to migrate.4 7
For those couples where one partner has only permanent stay rights,
migration of a foreign citizen spouse may be even more difficult. In the
United States, for example, the country quotas for foreign nationals have
caused a substantial waiting time for the spouses and minor children of
so-called "green card" holders.48 Such waiting periods may help explain
the large number of undocumented family members in the United States.
43.
44.

See Protectingthe Family, supranote 27, at 6.
See, e.g., Alonso, supra note 32, at 215-17.

45. Seeid. at216.
46.
47.

See id. at 215-16.
See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 483,

487 (2002). Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, immigration has become yet more
cumbersome, especially for migrants from Muslim and Arab countries.
48.

See INA §§ 201(c), 202(a)(2), 203(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(c), 1152(a)(2), 1153(a) (2000)

(setting out numerical limitations on family migration). For the currently applicable waiting periods,
see VISA SERVS.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF

STATE,

IMMIGRANT

NUMBERS

FOR MARCH 2004,

at

http://travel.state.gov/visa bulletin.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). Currently, the wait for foreign
national spouses of permanent residents is four and a half years. See id. For Mexicans the wait is
nine years. See id. Congress has provided some relief by creating a special visa category for the
spouses and minor children of permanent residents. If they waited three years or longer for
admission into the United States and their petitions were filed on or before December 21, 2000, they
are eligible for a "V" visa. See INA § 101(a)(15)(v), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(V); see also Benson,
supranote 47, at 487.
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Often spouses and children migrate before their legal status is secured.49
The spouses and children of undocumented workers who do not have
any legal claim to family migration have also 50contributed substantially to
the increase in the undocumented population.
Administrative delays and quotas account for some of the
temporary separation of couples and families but are not the sole reason.
Many countries of immigration have set up financial requirements
before spouses can follow. The sponsoring family member has to show
that s/he is able to provide for the incoming migrant.5 1 Without such
documentation, entry will be denied. Other restrictions exist or are under
consideration.
Family members who have infectious diseases or violent or drugrelated convictions may not be able to immigrate. Other ways to
restrict family migration are through regulations upon arrival. For
example, in some countries, joining family members are not granted the
right to work.5 3 While most of these restrictions are currently based on
the family status and characteristics of the immigrant, such as health or
criminal backgrounds, increasingly the sponsor's suitability has been
questioned. In the United States this has been done primarily through
financial requirements for sponsorship which were made legally
enforceable through the 1996 immigration legislation.5 4 Canada is
considering legislation that would ban a potential sponsor from filing

49.

See, e.g., Benson, supra note 47, at 486-87.

50. See, e.g., id. at 485-86.
51. For the United States sponsorship requirements, see INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (exclusion as public charge); INA § 213A, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a (setting out requirements

for sponsor's affidavit of support).
52. See INA § 212(a)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(2). For further disqualifying grounds, see
generally INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Some of these provisions, including some of the health- and
crime-related provisions allow for waivers under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), especially when
the immigrant is an immediate relative-spouse, parent, son or daughter-of a United States citizen
who would suffer extreme hardship from a denial of admission.
53. See Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on
movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families,
art. 2, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 13 (equalizing position of workers from EU members states and their
families with that of nationals, including the right of family members to reside and work in another
member state).
54. See INA § 212(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C) (sponsorship requirement not
applicable to spouses and children of United States citizens); INA § 213A(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1183a(a)(1)(A) ("sponsor agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual
income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the

affidavit is enforceable").
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immigration papers for any family member for five years after he has
been convicted of a crime.55
The proposed EU directive on family unification would allow
member states to set the minimum age for family unification for married
couples up to age twenty-one.5 6 This would be permitted even if
domestic laws set the marriage age at eighteen or below. The EU has
stated two grounds on which it justifies this provision. It should increase
integration and prevent forced marriages.5 7 The latter rationale appears
to be designed to protect foreign women against cultural practices
58
perceived as prevalent in their home countries.
Such restrictions indicate that states consider immigration benefits,
even for spouses, not a right but rather a benefit that can be granted and
restricted at their discretion. 59 This implies that even if there were a
universal right to be reunited with one's family, the state has the power
to restrict it administratively, possibly even to the point where it
becomes meaningless. Also, the existing restrictions indicate that the
character of the sponsoring individual and her economic situation
become of paramount importance. Sponsorship may prove especially
burdensome for women since in all immigration countries women
continue to be paid less than men and tend to be disproportionately
represented in part-time and lower paying jobs.6 °

55. See Immigration and Refigee Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. 27, § 36 (2001) (Can.); see also
Tom Godfrey, Feds on Ban Wagon; Criminals Can No Longer Sponsor New Immigrants,TORONTO
SUN, Nov. 4, 2002, at 5.
56. See Family Reunification, supranote 19, art. 4(4).
57. See id. at Commentary on the articles, Article 4.
58. Interestingly enough, the member states do not view this provision as a potential
safeguard against the potentially abusive situation in which so-called mail-order brides may find
themselves. For a discussion of mail-order brides, see Nora V. Demleitner, In Good Times and Bad:
The Obligation to Protect "Mail-Order Brides," in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 613 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000); Eddy Meng, Note, Mail-Order
Brides: Gilded Prostitutionandthe Legal Response, 28 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 197 (1994).
59. However, such an expansive view of state's rights may be incorrect. International law and
treaties provide some protection for family migration, see Gallya Lahav, National, Regional, and
International Constraints to Family Reunification: A European Response, at http://migration.unikonstanz.de/german/veranstaltungen/workshp/lahav.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2004), for a discussion
on international instruments of migration policy, though it is unclear how far such protection goes.
60. In the United States citizens are exempt from the sponsorship requirements for spouses
and children. However, the obligations do apply to all Permanent Resident Aliens ("PRA") and
citizens sponsoring adult married children and parents. See INA § 212(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 82(a)(4)(C) (2000).
On pay inequity, see, for example, B. Tobias Isbell, Note, Gender Inequality and Wage
Differentials Between the Sexes: Is It Inevitable or Is There an Answer?, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 369 (1996); Equal Rights Advocates, Pay Inequity, at http://www.equalrights.org/
facts/paystats.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004). For a discussion of gender discrimination in

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/11

12

Demleitner: How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immig

2003]

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IMMGRA TION LAW

Current terrorism concerns may also lead to restrictions on family
and spousal unification. Not only have waiting times been prolonged,
but family members and spouses may be denied entry because of
suspected terrorist connections. 6' While this provision is more likely to
affect the entry of non-citizen husbands, some European countries
apparently consider restricting the rights of male residents in sponsoring
foreign wives. 62 These countries appear to deem the migration of
spouses from immigrants' home countries to be contributing to the lack
of integration
which may increase the attraction of radical groups and
63
causes.

64
England has proposed one such restriction on spousal migration.
Its goal seems to be to promote (immigrant) marriages in the country of
migration.65 While many men and women return to their or their parents'
countries of origin to find a spouse, the number of men doing so appears
to be larger. 66 By preventing the migration of foreign women as spouses,
the British government proceeds on the assumption that women can help
men with their integration into the host society. A non-native woman
would therefore impair the man's ability to settle and assimilate.
As the English proposal indicates, the unification of couples and
families is often assumed to have a salutary effect on the migrant.
Families assist in integration and help stabilize the migrant. Therefore,
they contribute to the reduction of crime, tend to increase the economic
productivity of the migrant and assure that less of the money earned by

immigration law, see, for example, BHABHA & SHUTrER, supra note 5; BREDBENNER, supra note
22.
61. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (exclusion on security and related
grounds); see also Markus Rau, Country Report: Germany 49, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? (Walter et al., eds. forthcoming

2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/country/germany.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Mix and Match, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2003, at 7 (discussing restrictions on the
entry of foreign spouses in Denmark).
63. The term "immigrant" is used loosely here and includes also the children of immigrants. It
is often the second generation-often citizens of their parents' country of immigration-who return
to their parents' country of origin to find a wife or husband.
64. See Anthony Browne, Age Bar to Curb ForcedMarriages,THE TIMES (London), May 14,
2003, at 2.
65. Concerns about high numbers of immigration do not appear to have motivated this
legislation. In the United States, however, proposals to restrict immigration, including in some cases
spousal migration, have traditionally been tied to concerns about migration control. See generally
Federation for American Immigration Reform, Why America Needs an Immigration Time-Out, at

http://www.fairus.org/news/NewsPrint.cfn?ID=1168&c=12

(last visited Feb. 20, 2004). In the

wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, they have increasingly been explained in terms
of domestic security. See, e.g., id.
66. See Browne, supra note 64, at 2.
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the migrant is remitted to his or her home country.67 For these reasons,
permitting family migration is not a mere exercise of state generosity but
rather a crucial aspect of integrating and stabilizing migrant
populations.68 Such a positive perspective on family migration could
lead to a further dismantling of barriers to family unification, including
on unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex couples.
However, concerns about negative foreign influences, especially
through the relationship many consider the most intimate, may lead to
restrictions on spousal migration. Combined with the attitudes of
immigration restrictionists, such views may override what appeared to
have become an incipient international norm to increased spousal
unification, at least for citizens, permanent residents, and refugees, and
at least with regard to legally married opposite-sex spouses.
Spouses are not the only close relatives with access to migration
rights. Minor children are considered equally, if not more, preferred for
immigration purposes.
B.

The Parent-ChildRelationship

Despite the emphasis on the parent-child relationship, the term
"child" does not enjoy a uniform interpretation. Some countries consider
"children" for immigration benefits to be all those under eighteen; others
extend immigration benefits to children under twenty-one, as long as
they remain unmarried and dependent on their parents. 6 9 However,
67. Male migrants are frequently considered likely consumers of paid sex, and have been tied
to the exploitation of the victims of human trafficking. For those reasons men who migrate alone
also often suffer from and transmit sexually transmitted diseases, including the AIDS virus. See,
e.g., INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MOBILE POPULATIONS AND HIV/AIDS IN THE SOUTHERN
AFRICAN REGION (2003).

68. In many cases, spousal migration may be less beneficial. Domestic violence is a recurrent
problem in many marriages, including those where one or both partners are migrants. National laws
make increasing allowance for such situations. See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan,
Offering a Helping Hand. Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History of
Legislative Responses, 10 AM U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 95 (2001) (recounting legislative

developments in the United States); Migration und Bev6lkerung, Deutschland: Aufenthaltsrecht
nachgezogener EhepartnergeLindert (Apr. 2000), at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/population/miginfo/

migration und bevoelkerung/artikel/000303.htm.
69. For a definition of the term "child" under United States immigration law, see INA
§ 101(b)(1), (c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § I l01(b)(1), (c)(l). Canadian law allows the immigration of
unmarried sons or daughters under the age of nineteen. Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, 136 CAN. GAZETrE II, June 14, 2002, at 1, 20 (2002) (Can.) (definition of "dependent
child"), available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partll/tempPdf/g2-136x9.pdf;. For a discussion of
the dependency requirement, see David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering
Conceptions of Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991-92
(2002).
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various concerns about family immigration have caused some European
countries to re-consider such expansive coverage. Some proposals would
have restricted family migration to children younger than eight or ten
years old. 70 The justification for such blueprints appears to be that older
children have difficulty assimilating because of language deficits and
differences in educational systems. A potential consequence of such
restrictive immigration policies is that young siblings are separated as
families are only allowed to immigrate some but not all of their children.
Little allowance is made for the emotional impact the family and family
unity have on the child and vice versa; the emphasis tends to be on the
relationship between the child and society-not unlike claims about the
spousal role in a husband's integration and assimilation. The proposed
EU directive on family unification, which, if adopted, must be
implemented within two years after passage, allows EU member states
to restrict immigration benefits generally to minor children who have not
yet reached the age of maturity otherwise applicable under national
law. 71 However, if national legislation, at the time the directive is
implemented, already restricts migration to those fifteen and younger,
the member state may retain this lower age cut-off. Germany insisted on
a provision that allows member states to ascertain whether a minor child
who is older than twelve fulfills relevant integration criteria prior to
granting entry. 72 This means, for example, that children who do not
speak the language of the country of immigration may be denied the
right to reside there. The EU directive continues to permit divergent
rules for family unification but mandates that countries permit children
to be unified with their parents at least as long as they are younger than
twelve.73 Member states can be substantially more generous than the EU
floor, however.
In a number of cases the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") has addressed the affirmative right to family unification
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which

70. See, e.g., Migration und Bevdlkerung, Deutschland: Positionspapier der CSU zur
Auskinderpolitik (Feb.
1998), available at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/population/miginfo/

migration und-bevoelkerung/artikel/980202.htm

(describing

the position paper

of one

of

Germany's largest parties which advocated limiting family unification to children younger than age

ten).
71.

See Family Reunification, supra note 19, art. 4(l)(b), (c).

72. See id. art. 4(1)(c); EU: Einigung fiber Familienzusammenfiihrung, MIGRATION UND
BEV6LKERUNG, Mar. 2003, at 3, at http://www.migration-info.de/migration und-bevoelkerung/
archiv/ausgaben/ausgabe0303.pdf.
73.

See EU: Einigung uiber Familienzusammenfiihrung, supra note 72.
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guarantees "respect for [one's] private and family life.", 74 In its decisions,
the ECHR balances the right to family life against a state's interest in
regulating and controlling immigration.75 Even in cases involving
unification with young children, the latter interest dominated if the
parents did not have permanent stay rights in the country of immigration.
In Gill v. Switzerland, for example, the court denied a Turkish couple
who had a humanitarian permit to live in Switzerland the right to be
reunited with their then four-year-old son whom they had left behind in
Turkey.76 Because Switzerland had not granted the couple a settlement
permit and the family's situation was not caused by Swiss authorities,
the ECHR found the state had no positive obligation to allow for family
unification. 77 Despite a strong dissent, the court continued with this line
of reasoning in Ahmut v. Netherlands.78 The court there held that the
applicant's ten-year-old child had sufficient connections to Morocco to
remain there, and that nothing prevented his father from joining him
there. 79 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Martens criticized the majority
for its decision, and indicated that it may show "an increasing
'80
preparedness to condone harsh decisions, in the field of immigration."
There seems to be a growing tendency in the court's jurisprudence to
value a state's right to "protect" its existing population and the existing
population's increasing dissatisfaction with immigration, over an
individual's right to be united with her family, including minor children.
Nevertheless, minor children are still being treated relatively
generously, at least at an early age. Adult children, however, are often
excluded from immigration benefits, 8' or at least are subjected to long
waiting periods before being admitted.82

74. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
European Convention].
The European Commission on Human Rights and the Court have been criticized for not

including same-sex relationships in their definition of "family." See, e.g., Symposium, supra note
34, at 183 (discussion by Prof. Kristen Walker).
75. See European Convention, supra note 74, art. 8.
76. See 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93 (1996).
77.

See id. at 114-15.

78. 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 62 (1996).
79. See id. at 79.
80. Id. at 81 (Martens, J., dissenting).
81. The new EU directive, for example, provides that member states may provide only adult,
unmarried children of non-EU citizens with permanent stay rights the opportunity to immigrate if
they "are objectively unable to provide for their own needs on account of their state of health." See
Family Reunification, supranote 19, art. 4(2)(b).
82.

See VISA SERVS., supra note 48.
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Minor children can only rarely immigrate their parents.83 The new
United States visas for the victims of human trafficking are an exception
as they allow trafficking victims under the age of twenty-one to
immigrate their parents, either because they were the victims of severe
human trafficking and assisted the government in the investigation of the
offense and the prosecution of the offenders or because they were under
the age of eighteen when trafficked.84 A similar provision allows
immigration of the parents of minor children who fell prey to certain
violent crime. 85 The newly authorized T-visa adds unmarried siblings
under the age of twenty-one to the list of family members who may
immigrate, therefore enabling more parents of trafficking victims to take
advantage of this immigration opportunity. 86 However, many parents
with adult unmarried children or married minors might decline this
opportunity because it would force them to leave these children behind.87
Some countries permit adult children to immigrate their parents.
United States law, for example, grants United States citizens the
opportunity to immigrate their parents-under many of the same
conditions as spouses and minor children, including the requirement that
they show funds sufficient to support their parents. 88 The proposed EU
family migration directive allows, but does not mandate, member states,
to permit the immigration of the parents or parents-in-law of non-EU
foreigners with permanent stay rights if they have sufficient funds to
finance their parents' stay and if the parents have no "proper family
support" in their home country. 89 The latter may be a difficult
requirement to meet, especially if it is defined broadly to include
financial and emotional support and if extended family members count.
As ungenerous as some of the provisions for closest family
members may appear, even fewer rights are granted to other relatives.

83. The rationale for this rule, at least in countries that ascribe citizenship on the basis of ius
soli, is that individuals may enter without documentation or overstay a permitted stay with the goal
of having children who, upon birth, are automatically citizens and can sponsor their parents for
immigration.
84. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(T) (2001) ("T" visas).
85. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(15)(U) ("U" visas).
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T); see also President Signs Trafficking Victims Protection
ReauthorizationMeasure, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 42, 43 (2004).

87. Maria Jose Fletcher, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Presentation, Course on
International and Comparative Women's Human Rights, LL.M. Program in Intercultural Human
Rights, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Fla. (Jan. 23, 2004).
88. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (definition of "immediate
relative"); INA § 213A, 8 U.S.C. § II 83a (requirements for sponsor's affidavit of support).
89. See Family Reunification, supranote 19, art. 4(2)(a), 7.
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The Nuclear Family: A Western Construct?

In recent decades Western democracies have conceived of "family"
as a nuclear family, consisting of mother, father and one or more
(biological or adopted) minor children. 90 This construct is viewed as the
dominant model; if not numerically, then aspirationally. Nevertheless,
even in Western countries, many households do not fit this mold. Singleperson and two-person households have come to play an ever more
important role, 91 as have other models-grandparent-grandchild
households, for example 92-in which others, relatives and non-relatives,
live in the household, either in addition to or instead of the expected
nuclear family members.93
Despite its diminished reality, immigration law is based on the
assumptions of the dominant model. For example, it views adult,
married children as no longer part of the family but instead as having
their own, separate family. 94 This is especially the case when their
parents are no longer alive. Therefore, only a few countries of
immigration grant immigration benefits to siblings.95 Grandparents,

90. Under United States immigration law, children born outside of marriage and their father
can bestow immigration benefits upon each other only under limited circumstances. See, e.g.,
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). Mothers, however, are
considered primarily affiliated with their children and therefore are automatically eligible to sponsor
and to receive benefits through their children. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60. In these cases,
immigration law shows the inherent assumptions that continue to be made about family
relationships.
For purposes of refugee resettlements, UNHCR defines the nuclear family "as the
husband and wife, their minor or dependent children, unmarried children and minor siblings."
Protectingthe Family, supra note 27, at 6 (emphasis in original).
91. In the United States, about one quarter of all children, for example, live with only one
parent. See TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO. P20-514, MARITAL STATUS AND

LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) (Current Population Reports, 1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-514.pdf. For a discussion of the fiction of the nuclear
family, see, for example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,70 VA. L. REV.
879 (1984); Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387 (1993).

92. See, e.g., Karen Schwartz, Raising Children Can Be Tough the 2nd Time Around, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 23, 2002, at NI; Meg Milne, Older Generation Benefit from Childminding;
GrandparentPower, SUNDAY EXPRESS (United Kingdom), Nov. 24, 2002, at 28.
93. See, e.g., JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO. P20-547, CHILDREN'S LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002 (Current Population Reports, June 2003),

availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf.
94. See, e.g., INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (2000) (only married sons and married
daughters of U.S. citizens have right to family unification, but are subject to strict numerical limits).
95. See, e.g., INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4). While the United States allows for
sibling migration, because of the limited number allocated to this immigration category, currently
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aunts and uncles, cousins, nieces and nephews, are generally without any
immigration rights, independent of their emotional and financial
relationship to the potential sponsor.96 Largely for ease of classification
and to limit immigration benefits, the state has restricted immigration
rights to certain categories of individuals, usually without regard to their
actual relationship, other than financial dependency in certain cases,
with the immigrant.
However, in recent years low birth rates have driven some countries
to reverse long-standing policies. Spain, for example, recently permitted97
foreigners with any Spanish relatives to apply for residence permits.

Current Canadian law allows the immigration of even far removed
relatives if the immigrant otherwise does not have any close family
members in Canada. 98 Increased generosity in family migration has
traditionally been limited, however, to relations based on blood, through
marriage or adoption.
Recent Canadian proposals abandon this scheme, and their adoption
would bring about a stunning reversal in the traditional immigration
regime with its focus on blood or marriage-based relationships.9 9 No
longer would relatives be the only potential beneficiaries; immigrants
would be allowed to sponsor (one) close friend.' 00 The sole requirement
would be that the sponsored individual be "known and [be] emotionally
important to" the sponsor. 0 1 A more restricted proposal demands that
the persons had "a close personal relationship characterized by
emotional or economic interdependence for at least one year."'10 2 Such a
definition would limit sponsorship to interdependent relationships and
preserve greater immigration control. The latter has become a dominant
concern. However, because of the financial requirements of sponsorship,

the backlog is about twelve years. See VISA SERVS., supra note 48. Because of country quotas, the

waiting periods for Filipinos is about twenty-two years. See id.
96. Canada allows the immigration of grandparents as well as of siblings, nieces and
nephews, and grandchildren, as long they are unmarried orphans under the age of nineteen.
Immigration Regulations, SOR/78-172, § 2(1) (1978).
97. See Isambard Wilkinson, Door Opens for Million Immigrants to Spain, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (United Kingdom), Jan. 20, 2003, at 13 (stating that a work visa is no longer required

for such immigration).
98. Immigration Regulations, supranote 96, § 2(1).
99. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 35, ch. 3, pt. I.
100. See id. ch. 3, pt. Ill, Recommendation 9; see also CANADA, DEP'T OF CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATIVE REVIEW ADVISORY GROUP, NOT JUST NUMBERS: A
CANADIAN FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE IMMIGRATION 47 (1997) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATIVE ADVISORY GROUP].
101. IMMIGRATION LEGISLATIVE ADVISORY GROUP, supranote 100, at 48.
102. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 35, ch. 3, part III.
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it is unlikely that immigrants would attempt to sponsor random
strangers, especially if there were also an additional numerical limit on
such sponsorships. This proposal, if enacted, would remove the
assumption that it is only relatives with whom we are so close that they
deserve sponsorship, and presumably recognize that for many
individuals it is 0 non-relatives
who would provide the greatest benefit in
3
settling abroad.1

Extending the concept of familial relationships might reinvigorate
concepts of family in countries of immigration that would have
otherwise become extinct. This could, however, lead to divergent
developments of family models in sending and receiving countries as in
the developing world the nuclear family increasingly displaces the
extended family. 10 4 On the other hand, an expansion of the notion of
blood- or marriage-based sponsorship might enable individuals to free
themselves of the pressures of family members to immigrate them, and
therefore create more similar familial models in both sets of countries.
The UNHCR has long advocated that refugee families be reunited
based on principles of dependency rather than the predetermined concept
of the (nuclear) family.' 0 5 Because refugees often depend on extended
family members, either for cultural reasons or because of the refugee
experience, UNHCR has asked that "economic and emotional
relationships between refugee family members be given equal weight
and importance in the criteria for reunification as relationships based on
blood lineage or legally sanctioned unions."' 1 6 This approach allows for
a culturally sensitive approach as well as needed flexibility in the family
10 7
unification of refugees, a particularly victimized and protected group.
Many immigration countries have used the concept of dependency,
however, to limit immigration only to close relatives who are financially
dependent on the sponsor. 10 8 Therefore, they moved away from the
UNHCR approach by focusing again on blood or legal relationships and
103. Such non-relatives may be the women who raised the children who sponsor them,
neighbors abroad, business partners or best friends. In countries that do not allow for same- or
opposite-sex partners to sponsor each other, a best friend provision may provide individuals with a
less disputed opportunity to sponsor their partner.
104. See Jastram, supra note 10.
105. See Protecting the Family, supranote 27, at 1-2.

106.

Id.at 2.

107.

See id. at 5-6.

108. Some countries, such as Italy and Luxembourg, for example, will allow the migration of
elderly parents of a refugee only if the financial dependency of the parents on the refugee is
established. See EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & EXILES, SURVEY OF PROVISIONS FOR REFUGEE
FAMILY
REUNION
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
58,
64 (1999),
available at

http://www.ecre.org/policy/research_papers.shtml.
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by restricting dependency solely to finances. Presumably some of these
restrictions arise from immigration control concerns and fears that
refugees would abuse a less restrictive regime.
D. The Future of Family-basedMigration
Despite some expansions in the area of family unification, at a time
when Western countries are increasingly concerned about
immigration, 0 9 a countervailing trend has been towards restricting
family unification. While there seems to be a growing recognition that at
least spouses and young, minor children have (some) right to reside with
their families, the question remains which country should provide
individuals with the space to reunite their family.
Periodically, anti-immigration forces attempt to limit family
migration to the United States by eliminating the right of United States
citizens to sponsor their parents and siblings.110 In Western Europe,
substantial restrictions on the right of non-EU citizens to reunite their
families have occurred because countries have limited the migration of
minor children and parents."' Other, less direct restrictions are also
possible through increases in the required financial resources of the
sponsor or through stricter bureaucratic hurdles, such as language
requirements for the beneficiary.' 12 The trend in some countries seems to
109. Such concern emanates from a variety of sources, including overpopulation and
environmental degradation; economic worries, especially in times of high unemployment; the
destruction of culture through the admission of immigrants who cannot or do not want to assimilate;
the retention of the primary language through the influx of one large group of immigrants with a
different primary language; the destruction of the welfare system because immigrants
disproportionately rely on it; and fears that foreign terrorists may be able to enter and remain in the
country as migrants. See, e.g., Libby Brooks, Asylum: A Special Investigation: 5 Tough Questions
About Asylum, GUARDIAN (London), May 1, 2003, at 2 (discussing asylum seekers in Great
Britain); Peter Finn, A Turn From Tolerance, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at Al (discussing
immigration integration difficulties in Denmark).
110. While this is a right of United States citizens, it is one that largely benefits naturalized
citizens, i.e., ex-immigrants. In fact, immigration offices tout the right to immigrate one's family
members, including parents, as a primary benefit of naturalization. See BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION THROUGH A FAMILY

MEMBER, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/family.htm (last modified Oct. 30, 2003)
(indicating that United States citizens can sponsor parents, spouses, children of any age or marital
status, and siblings, whereas residents of the United States can only petition for their spouses and
unmarried children).
11. See, e.g., Family Reunification, supra note 19; EUobserver.com, New Rules for Thirdat
http://www.euobserver.com/
Reunification,
Family
Country
index.phtml?print-true&sid=9&aid=9520 (visited last June 19, 2003).
112. United States law distinguishes so-called "after-acquired" families from preexisting
families. The latter, formed before the principal immigrant's admission to the United States, can
come in immediately with the immigrant or follow him shortly while the latter, formed once the
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be toward more restrictions, largely because of general fears about
increased migration, though countervailing developments do occur, as
the Canadian model shows. The reason for these are three-fold.
First, international human rights law increasingly recognizes the
right to family unification and to special protections for married couples
and families. 1 3 Based on these rights, it has become impossible for
countries to systematically deny permanently settled migrants the right
to family unification, at least with regard to their spouses and children.
Even in areas of the law, such as refugee protections, where applicable
treaties do not explicitly mandate the right to family unification, it has
become generally recognized."14 Since by definition refugees and asylum
seekers cannot return to their countries of origin, the receiving country
must provide for family unification." 5 Some countries have interpreted
this right to evaporate, however, when the threat of persecution
dissipates. Japan has declared that starting April 1, 2004, it will no
longer allow Vietnamese refugees to bring family members into the
country since it determined that there is no on-going danger of
persecution in Vietnam.116 Legal obstacles are not the only hurdle for
the length of recognition
refugees in reuniting their family. Often
7
proceedings delays family unification."
Second, countries find it to their advantage to admit close family
members of migrants. Often they are able to facilitate the integration
process and to enable the migrant to establish him- or herself more
quickly. Family members are also crucial for the healing of refugees or
asylum seekers who are accepted because they were persecuted in their
home countries." 18 The presence of family members also reduces
principal immigrant is admitted to the United States, often have a long waiting period, at least
unless the immigrant naturalizes.
113. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 16; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 23; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 10(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
supranote 1, art. 18.

114. See Protectingthe Family, supranote 27, at 3.
115.
116.

See Jastram,supra note 10.
See Japan To End Policy On Allowing Refugees Families From Vietnam, Cambodia,

Laos, KYODO NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2003.
117. See Jastram, supra note 10. Refugee admission into the United States has become
particularly slow since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite a refugee admission quota of
70,000, in 2002 the United States admitted 27,110 refugees. For 2003 the number was only slightly
higher: 28,422. See Hannah Betesh, Increased Security Scrutiny Keeps Refugee Families Apart,
NETWORK NEWS (Nat'l Network for Immigrant & Refugee Rights, Oakland, Cal.), Fall-Winter
2003, at 12; see also Rachel L. Swains, U.S. Security Backlog Strands Many Refugees in Camps
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A10.
118.

See Protectingthe Family, supranote 27, at 2, 12.
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remittances abroad-a useful benefit for the receiving countries since
the immigrants will spend the money on consumption or investment in
their new home country. 1 9 When countries of immigration compete for
particularly desirable immigrants, the generosity of their family
migration120 benefits might play a role in the immigrants' settlement
decision.

Third, once migrants manage to secure their situation, they will
attempt to unite their families, legally or illegally. Generous and speedy
family unification can help prevent, or at least decrease, large-scale
undocumented migration. 12 As the data on convicted and deported
offenders who attempt to return to the United States indicate, however,
with close families
even substantial prison sentences will not deter those
122
States.
United
the
to
back
come
to
attempting
from
For all of these reasons, some family migration is always in the
interest of the countries of immigration. However, some countries
attempt to limit such immigration to those they consider beneficial
family members, such as the educated and those with language ability,
to provide for
or attempt to keep out those who appear unable
23
themselves by setting up sponsorship requirements.

119. See, e.g., Kerala Monitor, Encourage Expats to Bring Their Families-GCCStudy (June
2, 2003), at http://www.keralamonitor.com/expatsgulf.html. For an account of how remittances
have changed life in the sending countries and of how family life and the role of women is impacted
by migration, see, for example, Amy Waldman, Gulf Bounty Is Drying Up in Southern India, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at A3.
120. See, e.g., Migration und Bev6lkerung, Deutschland: 10.000 weitere "'GreenCards" (Jan.
2002), available at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/population/miginfo/migration-und bevoelkerung/
artikel//020105.htm (discussing benefits attached to so-called "Green Card," a temporary work visa
for foreign computer specialists).
121. The nature and quantity of the immigration problem will also depend on other factors,
such as the country's geographic location, ease of undocumented entry, and enforcement efforts
within the country.
122. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000) (detailing maximum penalties for reentry after removal for a
criminal conviction); see also Linda Drazga Maxfield & Keri Burchfield, Immigration Offenses
Involving Unlawful Entry: Is FederalPractice ComparableAcross Districts?, 14 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 260, 262 (2001); Linda Drazga Maxfield, Fiscal Year 2000 Update on Unlawful Entry
Offenses, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. 267, 267 (2001). While not all of those returning do so for
family reasons, many do, especially if their families are unable or unwilling to relocate to their
former home country and if the deported individual was the family's primary breadwinner. See, e.g.,
Edward Hegstrom, Details of Deadly Journey Emerge: Illegal Immigrant Died Trying to Return to
Family, HOUSTON CHRON., May 23, 2003, at A33.
123. For a discussion of the class and race discrimination inherent in the current United States
immigration regime, see, for example, Kevin R. Johnson, Race and the Immigration Laws: The
Need for Critical Inquiry, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 187
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race
Discriminationand the ConstitutionalLaw of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Janice D.
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In receiving certain family members but not others, the immigration
law of the countries of destination shapes the composition of the family,
usually in accordance with the prevailing conception of family life in the
receiving country. Because the nuclear family is the dominant model in
Western countries, it should not be surprising that spouses and minor
children have preferential immigration rights. Hurdles with regard to
their admission can be ascribed to immigration control concerns, and
especially attempts to keep undesirable immigrants out or encourage
their immigrant family members to return home.
Immigration law constructs families not only through laws that
permit entry and stay. It also does so through laws that prevent or
prohibit families from continuing their residence in a foreign country.
Moreover, the role family considerations play in deportations sheds
some light on the relative importance the receiving country puts on
family and marriage, as opposed to other values.
II.

DEPORTATION: THE POWER TO DESTROY
MARRIAGES AND FAMILIES

While exile-the right to remove citizens from the state's
territory-has largely been prohibited in Western countries, 2 4 all
countries retain the right to remove non-citizens from their territory
through deportations. Most removals take place because non-citizens do
not have the requisite documents, such as visas or permanent residency
papers, to stay and/or work in a foreign country. 2 5 Such removals may
occur even if the individual has close family members who are nationals

Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the
United States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1994).
124. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1,art. 9; Protocol No. 4 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, art.
3,Eur. T.S. No. 46 (entered into force May 2, 1968) (article 3 provides that "[n]o one shall be
expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State
of which he is a national"); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1,art. 22(5), at 151
(entered into force July 18, 1978) (article 22(5) provides that "no one can be expelled from the
territory of the state of which he is a national"). Despite some disputes over the extent of the human
rights prohibition on banishment, there seems no doubt that individuals convicted of crime cannot
be exiled from their home country as punishment. For a discussion of banishment within a nation
state, see Jason S. Alloy, Note, "'158-CountyBanishment" in Georgia: Constitutional Implications
Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2002)
and Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2003).
125.

See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION

STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002

YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 213 (2003), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
aboutus/statistics/Yearbook2002.pdf.
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or permanent residents of the country of immigration.1 26 This may be the
case when the undocumented immigrant has failed to wait outside the
receiving country during the requisite waiting period.
In other situations individuals may be legally and permanently
settled in a foreign country but become deportable because they engage
in an undesirable activity, such as criminal conduct. 27 In the United
States, the 1996 immigration legislation 128 dramatically increased the
number of offenses that make an individual removable and restricted the
waiver provision that had previously allowed many convicted offenders
to remain in the United States because of the length of their previous
stay and close family relations. 129 In addition, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") construed the provision to apply
retroactively, 130 and began deportation proceedings against long-term
permanent residents whose offenses were many years, and in some cases
decades, in the past.' 3' It was not until 2001 that the Supreme Court held
32
the retroactive application of this provision unconstitutional.
However, the broad scope of deportable offenses and the lack of
extenuating circumstances for so-called "aggravated felonies" make
33
deportation for a criminal offense increasingly likely.
Most importantly, in the vast majority of cases in which the
permanent resident has a criminal conviction, her deportation will occur
126. See, e.g., Emma 0. Guzman, Comment, The Dynamics of the Illegal ImmigrationReform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Splitting-Up of American Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95
(2000) (discussing how deportation leads to the destruction of mixed families).
127. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (listing activities and behaviors under
United States law that trigger deportability). Since September 2001, a number of countries have also
made it easier to deport individuals based on suspicion of terrorism. See Rau, supra note 61, at 4951 (discussing new German law regulating expulsion of suspected terrorists).
128. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in sections of 8 U.S.C.).
129. See Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of ProposedReforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1950-54 (2000).
130. The INS is now part of the Department of Homeland Security. Since the demise of INS in
March 2003, deportations have rested with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, an arm of
the new Department. For a description of the immigration agencies, see http://uscis.gov.
131. See, e.g., id at 136-37; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Punishing the Past, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al7; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; When It Is Unjust, N.Y. TtMES,
Dec. 26, 1997, at A39.
132. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-26 (2001).
133. In the 1996 legislation, Congress also set up a more rigid administrative regime to identify
non-citizen offenders upon their incarceration and to hold deportation hearings while they are still
imprisoned so that they can be speedily removed directly from prison. See IIRAIRA § 303 (codified
as 8 U.S.C. § 1226); INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (describing expedited removal procedure).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld no-bail detention prior to removal. See Demore v. Kim,
123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003).
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independent of her family circumstances.' 34 She may be married to a
citizen, have citizen children or other close citizen relatives. The only
situation in which deportation of a Permanent Resident Alien ("PRA")
offender may be stopped is when her conviction has not been for an
aggravated felony. 135
For non-PRAs cancellation of removal is yet more unlikely as it
requires a showing that the citizen or PRA spouse, parent or child would
suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" from her
deportation. 136 However, a prerequisite is that the alien be a person of
good moral character' 37-a requirement impossible to fulfill after a
criminal conviction. Moreover, the hardship requirement is138very difficult
to meet, as its language and subsequent decisions indicate.
Because of the gendered nature of crime and criminal enforcement,
the number of removable men is substantially higher than that of
women. 139 Because of the high threshold set by the hardship provision,
men whose only close citizen relative is a spouse are usually unable to
fulfill the requirement, as spouses are generally expected to move with
their partner who is being removed. Therefore, the deportation provision
implicitly reinforces the assumption that wives move with their
husbands.
United States courts have held the mere existence of minor citizen
children irrelevant to the deportation decision. 140 Only in situations
where the lives of the children would be endangered in the parent's
home country, might the parent's deportation be halted. 141

134. See Morawetz, supra note 129.
135. See INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
136. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D).
137. See 1NA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).
138. See INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). See, e.g., Iturribarria v. INS, 321
F.3d 889, 902 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to hold that the upheaval and adjustment difficulties children
experience when accompanying a deported parent are sufficient to constitute exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship); In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding no
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship where deportee's children would be forced to follow
father and deportee's parents would be left behind).
139.

See, e.g., TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES,

1991: WOMEN INPRISON 2 (1994), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wopris.pdf.
140. See, e.g., Iturribarria,321 F.3d at 902 (holding that petitioner failed to show extreme
hardship to his United States citizen children); In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001); see
also United States v. Hernandez, 325 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying downward departure to
avoid deportation in light of minor children).
141. See Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 308-10 (7th Cir. 2002) (granting a stay of
petitioner's removal upon a showing that petitioner's daughter might be subject to female genital
mutilation in petitioner's native Nigeria). But see Bueno v. INS, 578 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D. 111.1983)
(finding no extreme hardship to child with serious gastric illness despite the fact that she would
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Upon deportation, an alien who attempts to reenter the United
States after being convicted of a felony can be imprisoned for up to ten
1 42
years unless the Attorney General has consented to re-admission.
Aggravated felons could be imprisoned for up to twenty years for reentry, again subject to a waiver by the Attorney General. 143 Therefore,
should a deported offender return to the United States, he is threatened
with substantial punishment.
Under United States law, the groups most privileged on the
immigration entry side-spouses and minor children-are not generally
determinative when removal is at issue.144 It is assumed that the family
could be reunited in another country, if necessary.1 45 On a more cynical
note, one might conclude that the state would like to see a family desert
by removing the individual
a criminal offender, and assists the family
146
virtually permanently to another country.
The state's interest in public protection appears to trump all other
considerations, including unity of a United States citizen or permanent
resident family. 147 This development parallels that in other areas of the
law where convicted citizen offenders are subject to a host of collateral

have to accompany her deported mother back to Mexico where treatment for the illness was
unavailable in the region in which they would be living).
142. For penalty provisions following unlawful entry after deportation, see INA § 276(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2000).
143. See id; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2002).
144. See Liu v. INS, 13 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1994); Al-Khayyal v. INS, 818 F.2d 827,
830 (11 th Cir. 1987); see also Morawetz, supra note 129, at 1950-54.
145. See Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Monreal, 23 1. & N. Dec. 56
(B.I.A.2001).
146. Domestic violence offenses, for example, carry a mandatory deportation sanction, under
the assumption that it benefits the spouse (and children) if the offender is removed. See INA
§ 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). However, research has indicated that spouses are less
likely to report family violence if deportation is a possible consequence. See, e.g., Nina W. Tarr,
PromotingJustice Through Interdiscplinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholarship Civil Ordersfor
Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 157 (2003); Tammy FonceOlivas, Abuse Cases Decline, EL PASO TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at IA. While battered spouses
demand protection, for financial and other reasons, they do not usually consider permanent removal
in their interest. See, e.g., Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriersfor Battered Immigrant Women: A
Comparison of Immigrant Protections under VA WA I & 11, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 143
(2002); Bernice Yeung, The Land of Blood & Money, SF WEEKLY (California), May 3, 2000,
available at http://www.sfweekly.com/issues/2000-05-03/feature.html/1/index.html.
147. Many families are mixed families for purposes of immigration law, i.e., different family
members have different immigration and citizenship status. For example, children born on United
States territory automatically become citizens while one of their parents may be a United States
citizen and one a permanent resident; alternatively, one child may be a United States citizen while
another is undocumented as the permanent resident mother is still waiting to immigrate her minor,
non-citizen child. See generally Michael E. Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, Al! Under One Roof: MixedStatus Families in an Era of Reform (Oct. 6, 1999), at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=6599.
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sanctions, many of which are designed to keep individuals from
reuniting with their families. 148 In some cases it even becomes
impossible for them to live with their family, usually under the guise of
public safety. 49 The implicit assumption made is that the family will
sever its ties with the offender because of the offender's criminal
conviction-and the state lends a helping hand.
In reality, however, the deportation of a parent often leaves the
spouse and children with two equally difficult choices: They can either
remain in the country of residence-often their country of citizenship or
origin-from which their spouse or parent is being deported; or they can
follow him to his country of origin. The decision will depend on the
specific family situation: was the deported family member the primary
breadwinner?; how long ago did she migrate to the United States?; how
old are the children, and what language(s) do they speak?; of what
opportunities will the children be deprived if they are being removed
from the United States?; what would be the situation of the couple in the
deported spouse's home country? Of particular concern to elderly
couples is likely to be a provision of the Social Security Act that
mandates that not only the person deported but also his non-citizen
spouse, should she follow him, will lose any Social Security benefits
derived through the deportee. Effectively, this forces many elderly
150
couples to decide between their spouse and their means of survival.
Since deportations of settled families were relatively rare prior to the
1996 immigration legislation, 151 little in-depth research exists as to how
families have made such arrangements. Some news reporting focused on
these cases upon the initial enforcement of the 1996 legislation. The
topic garnered more attention in the wake of the recent deportations of

148. See, e.g., Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 24 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Nora V. Demleitner, "CollateralDamage": No Re-Entry
for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1044 (2002); SUSAN M. KUZMA, UPDATE OF FEDERAL
SECTION OF CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 9 (2000).
149. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (banning drug offenders from federally
subsidized or funded housing); see also Demleitner, supra note 148, at 1036, 1043-44.

150.

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Suspending the Social Security Benefits of Deported Aliens:

The Insult and the Injury, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1236-37 (1979).
151. This holds true for deportations based on criminal convictions as well as deportations
based on lack of immigration status.
See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
247, 249 (2003).
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migrants from Arab and/or Muslim countries,
most of whom are being
15 2
deported because of immigration violations.
The legislative and judicial disregard of most family situations may
appear astounding at first glance, especially in light of other rhetoric
focused on the protection of children and families. However, this
approach in the cases of convicted non-citizens tracks to a large extent
the sentencing of citizens in the federal system. 153 The United States
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, mandate that family circumstances
are "not ordinarily relevant."' 154 While this language is restrictive, federal
judges are able to consider family circumstances at least in unusual
situations, akin to the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
language. 55 A recent congressional amendment to the Guidelines goes
yet a step further, however, by denying federal judges the opportunity 156
to
consider family circumstances in the sentencing of all sex offenders.
The impact of a sentence on family members is not deemed relevant
because Congress views the offender's actions as so heinous that any
sentence should be determined based on his actions alone, without
regard to the impact on third parties. 157 The underlying assumption is

152. See, e.g., Caryle Murphy & Nurith C. Aizenman, Foreign Students Navigate Labyrinth of
New Laws; Slip-Ups Overlooked Before 9/11 Now Grounds for Deportation, WASH. POST, June 9,
2003, at B 1; Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands ofArabs and Muslims Could be Deported, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at Al; see also War on Terrorism. Immigration Enforcement Since
September 11, 2001. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, BorderSec. and Claims of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 30 (May 8, 2003) (prepared statement of Laura W.
Murphy and Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
murphy050803.htm.
153. The federal system is the appropriate comparator as Congress has the legislative authority
over both immigration law and the federal criminal system, including sentencing. See, e.g,
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2002). A recent judicial survey
indicated that federal district and appellate judges would prefer more flexibility in sentencing,
which could allow them to consider family circumstances. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL

SENTENCING GUIDELINES B-5, D-5 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Pena-Tejeda, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20061, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 1999). Recent congressional legislation, however, has aimed at limiting such judicial
departures. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (encompassing Feeney
Amendment). In its initial draft the Amendment would have outlawed family-based departures in all
types of cases. For the history of the Feeney Amendment, see Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal
Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING. REP. 310,310-13 (2003).
156. See PROTECT Act § 401(b)(4).
157. But see Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383
(2002) (arguing for greater consideration of third-party interests in sentencing).
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right since he had it in his power not
that any penalty serves the offender
58
to commit the criminal act. 1
The deportation of criminal offenders despite their close family ties
in the United States pits two sets of values against each other: public
protection and the integrity and protection of the family. 159 The latter
disappears from public discourse when non-citizen offenders are at
issue. They are generally discussed as if they had no ties in the
community-in fact, it is the community that appears to demand their
removal to guarantee public safety. In light of the benefits Americans
believe citizenship and residency in the United States hold, many view
the removal of non-citizens for criminal offenses a cleansing of society
of those considered undesirables.
The categorical approach adopted by the United States in the wake
of the 1996 immigration legislation is unique if compared to the laws in
other Western democracies. Canadian courts, for example, have held
family considerations highly relevant in deportation cases. 160 Citizen
children create strong humanitarian and compassionate considerations
counseling against deportation, 16 1 as do other close family ties. This
means it is the family connection rather than the crime that provides an
important starting point for the analysis. The same holds true in many
European countries. National courts and the ECHR have rejected
attempts to deport non-nationals based on criminal convictions if the
158.

For a discussion of the impact of imprisonment on the children of offenders, see John

Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities,
and Prisoners, in 26 CRIME AND JUSTICE: PRISONS 121 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds.,
1999) and Brown, supra note 157, at 1395-96.

159. United States courts have generally rejected the argument that removal of a parent would
amount to the "de facto deportation" of citizen children.
[C]ourts have reasoned (a) that a citizen child cannot make a real choice about where to
live and thus is dependent on the decision of his or her parents; (b) that the child's

removal from the country is not inevitable because the parents might choose to leave the
child with foster parents in the United States; and (c) that in any event the citizen child
will be free to return to the United States upon attaining majority.
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 628 (3d ed. 2002); see also
Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1984); Acosta v. Gaffhey, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157-58
(3d Cir. 1977).

160. See, e.g., Wu v. Canada, [2001] F.C. 1274 (Can.) (stating that immigration officers must
balance Canada's interest with family interests and the circumstances of all the family members);
see also Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.).

161. See, e.g., Baker v. Canada, [1999] S.C.R. 817 (directing immigration officers to consider
the best interests of the appellant's four Canadian-born children when making a determination on
whether to deport appellant); see also Legault v. Canada, [2002] 4 F.C. 358 (C.A.). But see Parsons

v. Canada, [2003] F.C. 913 (Fed. Ct.). For an in-depth analysis of Baker and its aftermath, see
generally Sharryn Aiken & Sheena Scott, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) and the Rights of Children, 15 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 211 (2000).
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center of their life, including their families, is in the country of
immigration. 162 The ECHR addressed the deportation of non-citizens
with close family members in the deporting state in a number of cases
where it has explicitly balanced the right to family life against the state's
63
interest in protection. 1

One of the most highly publicized cases in Germany involving the
deportation of a minor occurred in 1998 when Germany removed a
fourteen-year-old Turkish boy who had grown up in Germany to
Turkey. 64 The boy had been born in Germany and did not speak much
Turkish. Prior to his fourteenth birthday-the age of criminal liability is
fourteen-he had committed a substantial number of property and
violent offenses. 65 After he turned fourteen, the city of Munich and the
Bavarian government moved to have Mehmet, as the boy became
known, and his parents deported. 166 The action against the parents was
dropped quickly, but Mehmet was convicted of an assault committed
after he turned fourteen, and subsequently removed to Turkey.'

67

Court

actions continued, and ultimately the highest Bavarian administrative
court ruled against the German government, ordering it to revoke the
deportation order and to grant Mehmet permanent stay rights.' 68 The
highest German administrative court affirmed the decision holding that
minors could only be removed after a series of criminal acts or upon a
particularly serious offense-all of which must be committed after the
offender turns fourteen. 69 The court did not find it necessary to analyze

162. See, e.g., Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, 815 (1991)
(finding violation of right to respect for family life when deportation order was given without
considering that all of the deportee's close relatives live in Belgium, one of the deportee's older
children had acquired citizenship, and that the three youngest children had been born in Belgium).
163. See, e.g., Beldjoudi v. France, App. No. 12083/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 801, 822 (1992)
(stating that the role of the European Commission of Human Rights is to balance the aim of
protection and the right to respect for family life). But see supra text accompanying note 74.
164. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Kastenhuber, Aufenthaltsrecht umfasst drei Stufen, NORNBERGER
NACHRICHTEN, Oct. 21, 1998 (because of German immigration law at the time, Mehmet did not

have a permanent right to stay in Germany though both of his parents had such a right). Under
current German law, Mehmet would be born a German citizen. Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht, v.
22.7.1913 (RGBI. IS.583, BGBI. III S.102-1) (last amended by Staatsangeh6rigkeitsrechtsreform,
v.
23.7.1999
(BGBI.
I
S.1618)),
available
at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/enlwillkommen/staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht
165. See Uwe Diederichsen, Kommentar: Das Mehmet-Menetekel, 47 N.J.W. 3471 (1998).
166. See id
167.
168.

See id.
See Silvester Stahl, Deutschland. Bundesverwaltunggericht bestdtigt "'Mehmet"-Urteil,

MIGRATION UND BEVOLKERUNG, Sept. 2002, at 2, available at
info.de/migration und bevoelkerung/archiv/ausgaben/ausgabe0207.pdf.
169.

www.migration-

See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:273

the constitutionally guaranteed protection of family life. Even after
this decision, however, Germany retains the right to deport minors as
long as they fulfill the requisite criminality threshold.171
Other countries have gone farther in protecting permanent residents
against expulsion even after commission of a criminal offense. Unless
the offenses committed were against the state or terrorism-related, the
new French immigration law makes it virtually impossible to remove
"those who entered France before age 13; the spouses of French citizens
or legal residents; the parents of children who are French' 72citizens; those
who have resided legally in France for at least 20 years."'
In addition to national courts, 173 the ECHR has heard numerous
deportation cases involving challenges under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights which guarantees "the right to respect for
[one's] private and family life.' 174 In its jurisprudence, the court has
generally focused on whether, based on the facts in each case, the state
has "struck a fair balance"' 75 between the right to family life on the one
hand and the state's legitimate interest in the prevention of disorder or
crime and the guarantee of public safety on the other. 76 To ascertain the
value of the family life at issue, it has looked toward the length and
quality of the family relationships as well as the number and location of
relatives. 177 For example, even the conviction of a serious violent crime
did not counsel in favor of deportation in the case of a deaf-mute whose

170. See id.
171. See id.It is assumed that annually a few hundred young non-citizens who were born in
Germany are being deported for criminal offenses. Deportations of juveniles for criminal offenses
are extremely rare in the United States, presumably because prison sentences are longer, with
offenders turning eighteen by the time they are deported. Crimes adjudicated as juvenile offenses
will not render the offender deportable. See Robert E.Shepherd, Jr., Collateral Consequences of
JuvenileProceedings:Part H, 15 CRIM. JUST. 41, 41 (Fall 2000).
172. See Carl R. Baldwin, France's Immigration Reform Limits The "Double Penalty" of
DeportationAfter Time Served, at http://www.ilw.com (last visited last Jan. 4, 2004).
173. See, e.g., Samaroo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. C/2001/0030 & 00525, 2001
WL 753400, 27-29 (C.A. July 17, 2001) (engaging in proportionality analysis, the English Court
of Appeal weighs seriousness of the criminal offense against right to family unity).
174. European Convention, supra note 74, art. 8; see also MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 226-27 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the role the

European Court of Human Rights has had in interpreting the right to privacy under Article 8).
175. See, e.g., Dalia v. France, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 76, 91 (1998).
176. See European Convention, supra note 74, art. 8(2) (stating interference with family life
permitted if it "is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others").
177. See JAN1S ET AL., supra note 174, at 258-59.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/11

32

Demleitner: How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immig

2003]

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IMMIGRATION LAW

family members were French citizens and lacked close ties to Algeria,
his country of nationality.178
The court has opted against an extensive definition of the right to
family life if the family could be easily reconstituted in another country
because the individual should not be allowed to choose his preferred
country of residence.' 79 In making such determinations, the court tends
to consider the practical feasibility of family reunions and the burden
deportation would have on the family relationship,1 80 as well as the ties
81
the potential deportee has to his or her country of citizenship.
Relevant are the potential deportee's language skills, length of stay, age
at arrival in the country of residency, and the number of close relatives
in the country of origin. 82 Such factors can trump even in situations
where the potential deportee has committed serious offenses, including
violent and drug crimes. 183 Under the court's jurisprudence, no per se
deportable offenses184exist, and any deportation must be tested against the
right to family life.
Critics of the court's jurisprudence abound as it appears
unprincipled and made on an ad hoc basis. 185 A number of judges have
criticized the apparent unpredictability of the court's judgments which
makes it difficult for national authorities to foresee the legality of their
actions. 186 Despite these problems and the fear that the court has moved
toward a more restrictive stance, the ECHR protects families and
marriages to a much greater extent than United States courts do. It
considers the impact of deportation on the potential deportee's family
life and does so in a pragmatic way.' 87 This is a far cry from the current
178. SeeNasri v. France, App. No. 19465/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458, 474-77 (1995).
179. See, e.g., Abdulaziz-v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 471, 68 (1985).
180. See, e.g., Berrehab v. Netherlands, App. No. 10730/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 329-31
(1988) (noting that the deportation of a father to his home country would make it difficult for him to
see his young child and thereby constitute a violation under Article 8).
181. See, e.g., Beldjoudi v. France, App. No. 12083/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 801, 823 (1992)
(noting that the deportee did not speak the language of his country of origin and had no familial or
other ties to his country, and therefore could be deported only under exceptional circumstances);
Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, 815 (1991) (stating that at the
time the deportation order was served, the deportee had returned to visit his native Morocco twice in
twenty years).
182.

See JANIS ET AL., supra note 174, at 259-60.

183. See, e.g., Moustaquim, 13 E.H.R.R. 802; Beldjoudi v. France, 14 E.H.R.R. 801.
184.

See JANIS ET AL, supranote 174, at 260.

185. See id. at 260-61.
186. See, e.g., Boughanemi v. France, App. No. 22070/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228, 249-50
(1996) (Martens, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Hrlne Lambert, The European Court of Human Rights and the Right of
Refugees and OtherPersons in Need of Protection to Family Reunion, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 429,
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United States law, which allows deportation waivers only under limited
circumstances, and then only in cases where the lives of United States
citizens are extraordinarily impacted by the removal. Based on the
immigration statute, United States courts have developed a much more
individualistic jurisprudence which discounts the third party impact of
deportation. Except in unusual circumstances, they fail to consider the
practical impact of deportation on other family members, especially
minor children. 188 Often parents face the stark choice of leaving their
children with relatives or friends in the United States or removing them
from the only country they have known and moving them to an unknown
society where they often have substantially less opportunity than in the
United States. Unless there would be exceptional hardship to United
States citizen children, courts do not factor the impact of the deportation
(or of the potential move) on children into their decisions. However, it is
likely that the deportation of a parent has a substantial detrimental
impact on any child, akin to the incarceration of a parent.
Moreover, the law does not allow for consideration of the effect of
the deportation on the individual to be deported. 8 9 All in all, United
States law weighs the protection of the public substantially more heavily
than the ECHR. In this respect, United States immigration law continues
the incapacitative approach of recidivist statutes and drug and violent
crime legislation which have lead to long-term sentences based on public
protection grounds.190
The approach of United States law may not be surprising despite
frequent assertions regarding the importance and value of family and
children. In contrast to many European constitutions and the European
Convention on Human Rights, the United States Constitution lacks a
provision that explicitly recognizes the right to a family life. Under
United States law, there are spuriously few opportunities for the
government to affirmatively recognize families or special relationships

429 (1999) ("[w]here the person in need of protection has not committed a serious offence, the
balance of interest would most likely weigh in his or her favour.").
188. See Thronson, supra note 69, at 996.
189. Prior to the 1996 changes in immigration law, courts could consider the hardship
deportation would impose on the potential deportee.
190. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding California's three-strikes

law for a minor theft against an Eighth Amendment challenge); see also Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (granting federal funding for
state prisons tied to truth-in-sentencing provisions which mandated that violent and sex offenders
serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences); Kevin R. Reitz, Federal Influence in State
Cases: Sentencing, Prosecution, and Procedure: The Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy,
543 ANNALS 116, 117-18 (1996).
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between family members.' 9' If it is done, then it frequently is done so in
a hierarchical manner, in which the state positions itself as the protector
of one family member against another. The starkest example is the
prosecution of drug-addicted women for delivering drugs to their
children during birth. 92 While the Supreme Court ultimately held the
collection of the evidence unconstitutional because it amounted to a
warrantless, non-consensual search, it did not challenge the underlying
assumptions of stark individuality or find that the state has some
responsibility for providing positive conditions for childbirth.' 93 Instead
the state here used the criminal justice system to sever a relationship
commonly recognized as the most important in early life. This differs
from the European approach where the special relationship between
women and the fetus/child during and immediately after pregnancy has
been recognized. 94 The member states of the EU, for example, offer a
panoply of protective legislation to safeguard the mother-child
relationship.' 95 The difference between positive and negative protection
for the family could not be more pronounced.
So far, the United States has failed to sign the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This Convention may provide an
added constraint on states to remove immigration violators, as well as
non-citizen criminal offenders, if the person to be removed has a child
permanently settled in the country of immigration. 96 According to
191. Usually state protection of families extends to negative rights, such as the right not to be
discriminated against because of one's family status, for example, illegitimacy. See JANIS ET AL.,
supra note 174, at 234. If recognition of a special relationship does occur, it is often in contrast to a
relationship of which the legislature disapproves. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
192. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-73 (2001); Johnson v. State,
602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); see also Tamar Lewin, Mother Clearedof Passing Drug to Babies,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at B7.
193. See Ferguson,532 U.S. at 76-86.
194. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E.C.R. 3047.
195. Such protective legislation has been criticized as contributing to gender inequality. See,
e.g., Dorothea Alewell & Kerstin Pull, An InternationalComparison and Assessment of Maternity
Leave Legislation, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 297 (2001); Fiona Beveridge & Sue Nott, Women,
Wealth and the Single Market, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1 (1996); Petra Foubert, Does EC Pregnancy
and Maternity Legislation Create Equal Opportunitiesfor Women in the EC Labor Market? The
European Court of Justice's Interpretation of the EC Pregnancy Directive in Boyle and Lewen, 8
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 219 (2002).

196. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note I, Preamble. One hundred-ninety states
have ratified the Convention. As of 2003, Somalia and the United States are the only remaining
signatories, and Somalia has indicated its interest in ratifying the convention. See OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE
PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last

updated Nov. 2, 2003).
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Article 9, states "shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his
or her parents against their will, except when... such separation is
necessary for the best interests of the child."' 97 Under this provision the
interests of the child constitute a substantial counterbalance to the state's
interest in removing an offender. Article 9 implies also a right for the
child to be with both parents rather than with only one parent. Therefore,
a child with two custodial parents where one parent is about to be
deported can still rely on this Article as s/he has the right to live with
guarantees
both parents. However, neither this nor any other convention
98
a comparable right to spouses or other close relatives.'
While generosity in admitting non-citizen family members is
important in constituting families, the right to continue such family life
in a settled place is crucial in guaranteeing family stability and
coherence. Often it is argued that because the requirements for United
States citizenship are much less onerous than those in European
countries,' 99 there is more justification to remove those who do not
naturalize and commit offenses. However, naturalization may (not)
occur for a panoply of reasons-economic, financial, political, cultural,
emotional, intellectual-so that the security of one's family should not
be tied too closely to this decision. A criminal conviction should not
render especially long-term resident non-citizens automatically
deportable and then make them ineligible to return for a decade or two.
Such a sanction seems unduly harsh, especially in its impact on family
members. In this respect deportation operates like other collateral
sanctions following criminal convictions, as all of them fail to consider
adequately their impact on family members, ascribing the family's
misfortune solely to the individual's actions.
Since 1996 the number of deportations from the United States has
risen dramatically.200 Most of the deported are individuals who have
entered the United States without documentation, usually after having

197.
198.

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supranote 1, art. 9(1).
Cf Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.

Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/46 (1979).
199. See generally, e.g., ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND

GERMANY (1992). Despite recent changes in Germany's immigration law, it is still considered more
difficult to acquire citizenship there than in the United States. See Devora Rogers, Germans

Consider U.S. Experience In Immigration Debate, Deutsche

Welle,

at http://www.dw-

world.de/english/0,,1430_A_1050110_l_A,00.html (Dec. 5, 2003).
200. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002 YEARBOOK
http://uscis.gov/graphics/
STATISTICS
176
(2003),
available at
OF
IMMIGRATION
shared/aboutus/statistics/yearbook2002.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/11

36

Demleitner: How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immig

2003]

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IMMIGRATION LAW

crossed a border without the requisite entry documents. 20 The number
20 2
of deportations of criminal offenders has also increased substantially.
While many of them attempt to make a life in their countries of
citizenship, 20 3 others have attempted to return to the United States. Reentry of a convicted and deported felon, however, carries a substantial
prison term. 2° 4 Prior to a change to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines effective November 1, 2001,205 all reentry offenses carried a
sixteen-level penalty enhancement. Since the change, the adjustment has
been more graduated, depending largely on the underlying felony
conviction.20 6 Even though this modification may have changed the
views of many district court judges, in a judicial survey conducted early
in 2002, more than half of the judges who responded expressed the view
that the imposed sentences for unlawful entry offenses were greater than
appropriate.2 °7 Further, the judges appeared equally split as to whether
208
A similar dichotomy
these sentences provide adequate deterrence.
existed with regard to whether such sanctions adequately protect the
public.20 9 While some of these responses may be connected to the
offender's underlying crimes, others are presumably tied to the
offender's motivation for reentering. However, judges cannot and do not
2 10
usually consider the offender's family circumstances in such cases.
Therefore, a number of offenders whose return was motivated by family

201. See id. A much smaller number of such removals are for individuals who entered legally
but then overstayed their visas. See id at 214.
at 177.
202. See id.
203. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts et al., Torn from Families and Jobs, Deportees Face Bleak
Future, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2003, News, at 1; Deborah Sontag, In a Homeland Far From Home,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 6, at 48. Some of these attempts do not involve legal activity. Central
American and Caribbean countries have complained about the influx of convicted offenders,
especially gang members in their early to mid-twenties. Many of them have re-established the gang
culture abroad and become involved in the drug trade. See MARGARET H. TAYLOR & T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL ALIENS: A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Randall Richard,
(1998),
at http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/taylorcriminal.htm;
Associated Press, 500,000 Deporteesfrom U.S. Wreaking Havoc, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 26, 2003;
see also Anna Gorman, Mexico Seeks Warning on Deportations,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at B6.
204. See 8 U.S.C. 1326 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(l) (2002).
205. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2. All immigration offenses are
federal crimes. Therefore, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines cover the sentencing of all
immigration offenders. See, e.g., Maxfield & Burchfield, supranote 118; Maxfield, supra note 118.
206. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2.
207. See MAXFIELD, supranote 154, ch. 2.
208. See id
209. See id.
210. The Sentencing Guidelines caution that "[f]amily ties ... are not ordinarily relevant" in
sentencing an offender. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6; see also supra note 155
and accompanying text.
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concerns, including providing for their families211and being a present
parent, child or spouse, will serve long sentences.
The reentry bar combined with the substantial penalties for such
entry make such informal family unification risky. That individuals still
attempt to cross international borders under such circumstances reflects
their need to be with their families in familiar surroundings and the
impossibility of uprooting a family after many years in the United States.
1II.

CONCLUSION

Despite giving lip service to the importance of marriage and family
to an individual's life, countries do not recognize the right to cohabit
with spouses and minor children as absolute. Speedy permission for
entry and residence may clash with a host of other goals of immigration
law, many of which seem to be irreconcilable with the right to family
migration for migrants. Even though obstacles to family unification are
often justified to prevent so-called "chain" migration,212 it is unlikely
that such hurdles deter migration as planned. More probably, they lead
to substantial dislocations, ranging from large remittances to
undocumented migration of close family members. The large population
of undocumented individuals in the United States-many of them
waiting for their papers based on close relationships to permanent
residents-bears proof of this phenomenon.
The term "family" should be construed broadly to allow for
different family formations that recognize the essential human need for
close relationships. While a few Western democracies consider a broader
construction of the term, many still restrict family migration to the
nuclear family. With a rising need for high skills immigration and
concomitant stable immigrant families, changes may, however, occur.
Initially a more favorable regime may benefit particularly better
educated and wealthier immigrants whose family is viewed as an asset,
either on its own or if weighed against the immigrant's skills. The value
family adds exists, however, for all immigrants, and may even be more

211. Anecdotal evidence indicates that many re-entrants do so to reunite with family members.
See, e.g., Edward Hegstrom, Illegal Immigrant Died Trying to Return to Family, HOUSTON CHRON.,
May 22, 2003, at A33 (having been deported for three DWI convictions, an illegal Mexican
immigrant died from heat exhaustion in reentry attempt; his return was motivated by a desire to be
with his children).
212. See FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, SHACKLED BY CHAIN MIGRATION (Oct.
2002), at http://www.fairus.org/ImmigrationIssueCenters/ImmigrationlssueCenters.cfm?ID=l 170&
C=12 (arguing for restrictions on family migration to prevent so-called "chain" migration based
solely on family status of immigrant).
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important for those who are unable to travel frequently to visit close
family.
As the state should assist in family formation by decreasing entry
restrictions and administrative hurdles, it should increase its recognition
of the value of family in making deportation decisions. The destruction
of families after many years of settled residence in a foreign country
undermines one of the most powerful pillars of society. More empirical
research is needed on this matter, but the intentional destruction of
family units is unlikely to lead to any beneficial results. Families should
not be forced to choose between one of their members and their country
of permanent residence. Instead the state should be responsible for the
rehabilitation and re-integration of such family members, as it is for
those of citizens.
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